Abstract: A method to overcome a correlation function based cryptanalytic attack in the case of chaos-based cryptography was proposed in the literature. The output of the transmitter, the synchronization message, was digitized and the weights of the bits of its binary representation were changed with a secret key consisting in a permutation only known by the two communication partners. The receiver was evolving according to the same equations as the transmitter. The present paper tests the feasibility of such an alteration of the synchronization signal, when the receiver does not have the same structure as the transmitter, being represented by a high-order sliding-mode observer. Simulation results are given for a chaotic Sprott's jerk circuit. Conclusions are drawn with respect to a physical implementation of such a schematic and the steps of the modified algorithm are summarized.
MAIN RESULTS
The chaotic jerk circuit in (2.1) promoted in (Sprott, 2011 ) is used as transmitter of a secret message. Its output, the signal that will be transmitted over the communication channel, is its first state, as it ensures regular local weak observability. The observability matrix for nonlinear systems, which uses Lie derivatives, is revisited in (Letellier, 2005) , showing that such a matrix can be interpreted as the Jacobian matrix of the map between the original phase space and the differential embedding induced by the observable, i.e. the output of the transmitter. See (Letellier, 2006) for a detailed discussion on how the choice of the output of the transmitter influences the reconstruction of its dynamics, by the receiver, in each point of the state space. The secret message is embedded by the dynamics of the transmitter (2.1) by using the inclusion method (Perruquetti, 2005) , being added, at each step, to its third equation: 
as indicated in (Levant, 1998) .
The solution of system (2.2) is given by (2.4).
The parameters L and K are to be chosen such that a good estimation of the original state space of the transmitter and of the included message is done, under as low chattering as possible. Such a good estimation is shown in Fig. 1 The distribution of this error, for the estimation of the message represented by a sine, square, sawtooth, respectively a random wave, is also given in Fig. 1 . It can be observed that the error represents less than 10% of the message signal. This will be the accepted threshold in the remainder of our argumentation. As the observer was initialized from the same state as the transmitter for the distributions in Fig. 1 , when computing the estimation error, all the samples of the messages were considered, the synchronization being established from the beginning. If the initial conditions of the observer are different from those of the transmitter, as in Fig. 2 , the samples prior to synchronization will be dropped. In Fig. 2 , the first period of the message was not considered when the distribution of the error was computed. To decide how many bits are necessary for the binary representation of the synchronization signal, the transmitter has to look at the accuracy obtained, in analog transmission, when estimating its states by using the highorder sliding-mode observer with the chosen parameters L and .
K The error in the digital-to-analog conversion of the synchronization signal must be approximately equal to the error done by the high-order sliding-mode observer when estimating the first state of the transmitter. Thus, the error 1 x e from (2.5) is considered, given that the synchronization signal, the output of the transmitter (2.1), is . bits. It is obvious that such a precision is out of question due to the delicacy implied by the technology needed to overcome the sensitivity to noise of circuits designed to achieve a resolution of (2) analyze its observability properties in order to decide which is its best output state, from this point of view; (3) choose the appropriate wave, its amplitude and frequency, corresponding to the secret message included in the dynamics of the transmitter; (4) set the order and the cutoff frequency of the low-pass filter needed to recover the secret message from the estimated state-space of the transmitter; (5) build the model of the communication scheme with the chosen transmitter, its output being sent to a high-order sliding-mode observer, which recovers the state-space of the transmitter; (6) deduce the expression of the secret message as a function of the states of the transmitter (the left inversion stage); (7) test the built configuration, in an analog configuration, for different values of the parameters of the observer until the desired precision is achieved; (8) knowing the dynamic range of the output and the desired estimation accuracy, deduce the number of bits necessary for the analog-todigital conversion of the synchronization signal; (9) alter the output by changing the weights of its binary representation according to a certain permutation; (10) exchange the secret key with the communication partner; it consists in the values of the parameters of the observer, established at step (7), the permutation chosen at (9), and the initial conditions and the parameters; the frequency of the low-pass filter is an useful information; (11) at the reception end, digitize the received signal on a number of bits equal to the number of the columns of the secret permutation and apply its inverse to retrieve the real synchronization signal; (12) reconvert in analog; (13) apply the obtained signal at the input of the assigned high-order sliding-mode observer; (14) obtain the state-space of the transmitter; (15) use the function existing between the secret message and the states of the transmitter to obtain it from the estimation of the state-space; (16) filter the result of the step (15) and process the secret message, according to the desired application.
The communication scheme proposed in this paper differs from the previous work, essentially in the following aspects: the receiver evolves according to different equations compared to the ones corresponding to the transmitter; the chaotic system chosen as the transmitter is, here, the Sprott's jerk circuit, and not the Colpitts oscillator; the message is included in the structure of the transmitter, and not added to the synchronization signal.
More simulations and the executables, obtained from Matlab-Simulink version R2013a, are given at http://catedra.elcom.pub.ro/~od/.
CONCLUSIONS
A previous work, (Tauleigne, 2014) , proposed a method to overcome a correlation function based cryptanalytic attack in the case of chaos-based cryptography. The output of the transmitter, the synchronization message, was digitized and the weights of the bits of the binary representation were changed with a secret key consisting in a permutation only known by the two communication partners. The receiver was evolving according to the same equations as the transmitter. Once the synchronization signal was correctly restored, the receiver has no difficulty in achieving the same dynamics as the transmitter and recovers the secret message.
The present paper tests the feasibility of such an alteration of the synchronization signal, when the receiver does not have the same structure as the transmitter. This time, the receiver has knowledge only on the output of the transmitter and its derivatives. The assigned observer estimates the synchronization signal and, by using its derivatives, restores the other states of the transmitter, and the secret message included in its dynamics. The reconstruction of the dynamics of the transmitter is done with a certain error, associated with the parameters chosen for the observer. This error has to be approximately equal to the one engendered by the digitization, in order to obtain the estimation of the message with a required precision. The threshold was established here at % 10  of the magnitude of the message.
Given the dynamical range of the considered system, the Sprott's jerk chaotic circuit, and the magnitude of the message, which has to be small enough so that it does not alter the chaotic behavior of the transmitter, the number of bits required for the digitization is too high to justify its implementation at large scale, due to the high precision it requires. The resolution required by the digital-to-analog (analog-to-digital) conversion, when the observer is a higher-order sliding-mode differentiator, is about , 15nV corresponding to 34 bits converters. This implementation is usually not feasible with common technology. Nevertheless, it still remains possible that the bitalteration of the synchronization signal method works well with other types of observers, other that the high-order sliding-modes.
